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Introduction 
Levels of electoral participation function as thermometers of how healthy a democracy is. 
When large numbers of citizens fail to turn out to vote, not only do they abstain from making 
a political choice, but they also signal a wider detachment from the democratic system. In 
recent decades, there has been a marked decline in party membership, ideological attachment, 
and ‘brand’ loyalty, leaving political parties without a strong core of supporters (e.g., Dalton 
2008; McAllister 2004) and the consequent need to make extra efforts to bring voters to the 
polling station. The mobilising efforts, engineered by parties and their candidates, are 
therefore particularly significant at this time. In this paper, we evaluate the impact of these 
efforts and assess their contribution to the levels of voter turnout. 
 
Campaign mobilisation consists of all of the activities aimed at enhancing the salience of an 
election in the eyes of the voters, with the ultimate goal of getting out the vote. Experimental 
evidence shows that citizens are more likely to vote when they are stimulated by exposure to 
campaign information (Green and Gerber 2008), and observational studies have confirmed 
the idea that campaign effort has a discernible positive effect on turnout (Geys 2006; Karp et 
al. 2008). We expand this line of research by exploring the link between campaign effort and 
turnout at first- as well as second-order elections in Britain, deepening our understanding of 
the similarities and differences between these types of elections. While research on voter 
turnout is comparative in nature (e.g., Baek 2009; Franklin 1996), previous studies have 
focused on the same level of election across countries. This study provides a comparison 
across different levels of elections within the same country. Next to that, we add nuance to 
the literature on turnout by addressing whether the effects of campaign effort are conditioned 
by the competitiveness of the race. Rational reasoning and empirical evidence (Blais 2000) 
suggests that turnout ought to be higher in competitive races, but the extent to which 
organised mobilisation effort and electoral competitiveness interact with each other remains 
unclear. Finally, we explore whether different forms of electioneering vary in their capacity 
to stimulate electoral participation.  
 
Using data from the 2010 British general election and 2011 devolved elections in Scotland 
and Wales, we find evidence that aggregate constituency-level campaign spending has strong 
positive effects on turnout at both types of elections. This effect is, however, not conditioned 
by the competitiveness of the race, suggesting that the effort put forward by parties and their 
candidates to get out the vote is equally beneficial in safe as well as marginal seats. The 
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disaggregated analysis of electoral activities offers an additional insight into the effectiveness 
of electioneering at getting out the vote. We find that different types of campaign effort vary 
in their capacity to stimulate turnout. Among the various campaign activities that would-be 
MPs use, providing unsolicited materials to voters emerges as a powerful trigger for electoral 
mobilisation in first- and second-order elections. In the former, campaign professionalisation 
also has a positive impact on turnout.  
 
While first- and second-order elections still differ in many aspects, there are also noticeable 
similarities between the two when looking at how campaign effort can mobilise the 
electorate. The patterns of how campaign effort promotes electoral mobilisation, albeit with 
slight tweaks, hold for both the 2010 general election and the 2011 devolved elections. 
 
The article is organised as follows. First, we describe the electoral context in Britain. Second, 
we survey the existing literature on campaign effort and turnout to specify our contribution. 
We then outline our theoretical expectations. Following this, we illustrate data and measures, 
proceed to the analytical findings, and conclude with a discussion on their implications. 
 
Studying Constituency-Level Electoral Dynamics in Britain 
We explore the determinants of turnout variance across different constituencies in Britain,1 
observing cases such as East Dunbartonshire where 81.9% of the electorate cast their ballot at 
the 2015 general election as well as cases like Manchester Central where only 52.7% of the 
electorate did so. In searching for an explanation of what determines such differences across 
constituencies, we focus on the potential role of local campaign mobilisation. 
 
This is not uncharted territory. Among the earliest to point at the local level as crucial for 
understanding British electoral politics were Denver and Hands (1974). They explored the 
role played by local campaigns in getting out the vote at general elections and suggested that 
campaign spending (used as a proxy for campaign effort) might actually have a bigger impact 
on mobilising the electorate than constituency marginality. This conclusion is very much in 
line with findings from the extensive ‘get out the vote’ literature from the United States 
(Green et al. 2003; Green and Gerber 2008; Imai 2005; Patterson and Caldeira 1983) and has 
                                                        
1 This is often referred to as the local level in the literature on campaign spending, while the literature on turnout 
generally labels it as the aggregate level in order to distinguish it from studies that address the determinants of 
individual-level turnout. We adopt the terminology in use in the campaign literature.  
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recently regained scholarly attention in the field of British electoral politics. A conspicuous 
body of literature has explored the extent to which local campaign effort has an impact on 
electoral success (e.g., Clarke et al. 2004, 2009; Cutts 2014; Fisher et al. 2011; Whiteley and 
Seyd 1994) and the mobilisation of voters (for the effects of campaign effort on turnout, see 
Benoit and Marsh 2003b; Karp et al. 2008; Karp and Banducci 2007; for Britain-specific 
studies see, among others, Fisher et al. 2011, 2015; Pattie et al. 2003), leading to substantial 
agreement on its overall positive effect. Local campaigns have been proven to be significant 
drivers of electoral participation in UK general elections (Fisher et al. 2015; Fisher and 
Denver 2009; Johnston and Pattie 1998) where parties have demonstrated their ability to 
target campaign efforts strategically, in order to make gains (or contain losses) where most 
needed. 
 
While there is little dispute over the effectiveness of campaigning, there are several elements 
of the process through which campaigns stimulate turnout that remain unclear. First, evidence 
is still limited to first-order elections. This study investigates the role of campaign 
mobilisation effort in the context of a general election and devolved elections in order to 
extend our understanding of the latter and assess how closely the electoral dynamics 
associated with first- and second-order elections mirror each other. This remains an open 
puzzle in the field of electoral studies, particularly in the case of Britain. On the one hand, the 
diversity in terms of electoral systems – i.e., UK general elections exclusively use First-Past-
the-Post, whereas the devolved elections in Scotland and Wales use the Additional Member 
System – suggests that differences might outweigh similarities. Moreover, elections for the 
devolved assemblies are characterised by lower turnout levels and different individual-level 
voting patterns than Westminster elections (Wyn Jones and Scully 2006). These elements 
indicate that first- and second-order elections are indeed unconnected electoral arenas and 
that the defining traits of the latter should make them substantially different from general 
elections. On the other hand, the ‘second-order’ nature of the devolved elections is reduced 
by the strength of these administrations as they have primary legislative power over a wide 
range of policy areas, but also by the strength of the sub-state identities in question (Jeffery 
and Hough 2009). ‘Not all second-order elections are equally unimportant’ (Marsh 2004). 
Also, for those involved in the mobilisation effort – parties and candidates – there is no 
difference in the incentives: when running for office, a rational agent should attempt to win, 
regardless of the type of office in question. As a result, the mobilisation effort should be 
equally efficacious. 
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Second, most studies of campaigning in Britain are limited to the main parties: Labour Party, 
Conservative Party, and Liberal Democrats, effectively excluding from the empirical estimate 
the effort of the ‘smaller’ contenders. While this used to suffice in uncovering the dynamics 
of constituency-level turnout variation, a more encompassing approach is now needed. Not 
only are the ‘smaller’ parties securing parliamentary representation with increasing frequency 
– e.g., Caroline Lucas was elected in Brighton Pavilion as the first Green Party MP in 2010 
and UKIP’s Douglas Carswell secured a seat in 2015 –, but there is also a tangible 
mobilisation effort associated with those parties – e.g., the Scottish National Party has been 
successful recently in engaging the electorate, as evident from the record number of its MPs. 
‘Smaller’ parties contribute to the political landscape of Britain now more than ever, and their 
inclusion in the analysis of the constituency-level electoral dynamics leads to a more accurate 
picture of what voters experience in the lead up to an election. The efforts of these parties are 
neglected when restricting the analysis to few main players. We conceptualise – and 
consequently empirically treat – electioneering as the cumulative effort of all parties. By 
accounting for all the actors in the race – regardless of their electoral prospects – we offer a 
more complete account of the extent to which voters experience electoral stimuli and with 
what consequences. 
 
Third, if consensus exists on the effectiveness of the overall electoral effort, only a handful of 
studies break down the various forms of organised mobilisation. Fisher et al. (2015), using 
data from a survey of electoral agents, explore the diversity of campaign types and assess the 
effectiveness of different activities to reiterate that traditional campaign techniques are 
particularly successful at getting out the vote. Conversely, they find that e-campaigning was 
ineffective at driving voters to the polling station, outlining the differential effects of various 
types of mobilisation efforts. Our approach is not too dissimilar but, instead of following a 
taxonomical approach based on theories of campaign change (e.g., Denver and Hands 2002; 
Farrell and Webb 2000; Norris 2000), we rely on the classification of campaign expenses as 
imposed by legislation. This enables us to identify the extent to which different activities 
stimulate turnout, while bypassing the limitations of survey data such as non-response and 
missing values. 
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Campaign Mobilisation Effort, Competitiveness, and Electoral Participation 
When parties and candidates actively engage on the ground by intensifying their efforts to 
win votes, they simultaneously intensify the public debate surrounding the election in its own 
right, and push competitors to raise their game in response. Studies of negative campaigns 
show that the more aggressive the campaign effort, the higher the likelihood of voters casting 
their ballot.2 Clearly, this likelihood should be particularly high when the election is expected 
to be a close race, as the perceived utility of voting is greater in a more marginal constituency 
than in a safer one. Indeed, previous studies find two constituency-level characteristics to be 
particularly influential in determining how many people cast a ballot: the marginality of the 
race and campaign effort (Geys 2006). While focusing primarily on the latter, we also 
explore the interaction between these two elements, on the premise that they might condition 
each other’s effect. When an election is a close contest, the probability that one vote might 
influence the outcome is seen as higher and it acts as an additional motivation to cast a ballot. 
Matsusaka and Palda (1993) refer to this mechanism as the Downsian closeness hypothesis. 
Voters acknowledge that the benefits of casting their ballot are not limited to merely fulfilling 
their sense of civic duty, which voting in very safe seats is arguably restricted to, but that they 
may also influence the electoral result. Therefore, more marginal constituencies should 
experience higher levels of turnout. With regard to campaign effort, the more candidates 
(cumulatively) spend on their campaigns in a given constituency, the greater their collective 
capacity to engage with voters and expose them to electorally relevant information. As voters 
experience more electioneering – defined as the kinds of campaign activities that get people 
out to vote (Bowler and Farrell 2011: 683) – the amount of information that they have on 
candidates and their policy positions is subsequently higher. Consequently, voters in 
constituencies with more intense campaign activity have to bear lower costs of information 
acquisition (Chapman and Palda 1983; Dawson and Zinser 1976), increasing their likelihood 
of voting. Therefore, we expect overall campaign effort, as well as the marginality of the 
race, to be positively related to constituency-level turnout. So far, work that assesses the 
effects of  campaign effort on turnout at second-order elections is limited, with the notable 
exception of Marsh and Benoit’s studies of the Irish local elections of 1999 (2003a; 2003b). 
Nevertheless, there are no strong theoretical reasons to expect that the effects of campaign 
effort should be any different at second-order elections.  
 
                                                        
2 See, for example, Lau et al. (2007) for a comprehensive review of this literature. 
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The independent effects of both marginality and campaign effort are well established in the 
literature. We move forward by exploring the potential moderating role that the closeness of 
the race may have on the effectiveness of campaign effort at stimulating turnout. There are 
reasons to expect this to be the case. First, voters in marginal seats are likely to have a greater 
incentive to pay attention to the electorally relevant information that is made available to 
them since their vote is seen as more important. Second, marginal constituencies tend to lack 
strong incumbents; in these circumstances acquiring information on candidates becomes a 
necessity. This line of reasoning is also supported by Milazzo’s (2015) findings that voters in 
marginal seats have more accurate knowledge of the parties’ policy positions than those in 
safe ones. Therefore, we expect the positive effect of campaign effort to be conditioned by the 
marginality of the race. The effect of campaign effort should be amplified in marginal seats 
and depressed in uncompetitive races. This mechanism should be no different in the context 
of second-order elections.  
 
From Effort to Efforts 
When it comes to capturing campaign effort, both the literature on campaign effectiveness 
and the studies of mobilisation effects on turnout use some form of proxy to gauge the 
concept. Most measures in use are very close to one another (Fieldhouse and Cutts 2009), so 
that studies based on electoral agent surveys (Denver et al. 2003) can be safely compared to 
those that are using electoral returns (Johnston and Pattie 1995) or party contact as reported 
in voter surveys (Clarke et al. 2004; Karp et al. 2008; Whiteley and Seyd 2003). This was 
very recently echoed by Fisher et al. (2015) who show a high level of robustness across data 
from an electoral agent survey and electoral returns.  
 
Here, we rely on electoral returns data to assess the effects of campaign effort on turnout. The 
obvious advantages are the completeness of electoral returns and their availability for general 
elections as well as devolved elections. Clearly, these data also have limitations: e.g., 
spending returns are unable to capture the extent to which a campaign relies on free volunteer 
labour or how campaign stimuli may be internalised by voters and lead to a higher likelihood 
of voting. The latter can be adequately disentangled only by experimental research, while the 
former is a limitation of spending data. That said, the benefits of using electoral returns data 
compiled by the Electoral Commission are substantial. These data benefit from their 
completeness – all candidates are subject to the same regulatory provisions on reporting – 
and granularity. This allows us to go beyond interpreting campaign effort as a monolithic 
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activity. To date, the corpus of studies using campaign spending as an indicator of campaign 
effort, whether addressing its role in increasing turnout or winning votes, tends to rely on 
aggregate measures of spending. In a comprehensive meta-analysis of the literature, Geys 
(2006) shows that, while electoral spending is consistently one of the most significant 
positive predictors of turnout, the distinction between (and comparative impact of) the 
different types of campaign activities needs further attention. In this respect, electoral returns 
data, despite certain shortcomings, do a good job of capturing the nuances of electioneering, 
allowing one to isolate the effects of different campaign activities. 
 
The electoral spending of candidates in Britain is regulated by the Representation of the 
People Act 1983 and the Political Parties and Elections Act 2009.3 While the 1983 Act has 
undergone a long series of updates,4 the section relating to campaign spending categorisation 
(i.e., List of Matters) has remained unchanged. Campaign expenses are still divided into: 1) 
Advertising, 2) Unsolicited Material, 3) Transport, 4) Public Meetings, 5) Staff, and 6) 
Accommodation and Administration. This distinction between spending on the different 
campaign activities is important. While campaigns convey information on candidates and 
parties, not every campaign activity is equally relevant with regards to mobilising voters. For 
example, spending money on stationery and transport is important to running electoral 
campaigns, just like putting posters on billboards or leaflets through letterboxes, but the 
public are only directly exposed to the latter. Moreover, even across these activities there 
may be a hierarchy of effectiveness that needs exploring. For example, Sudulich and Wall 
(2011) find that posters were more effective than other campaign tools at winning votes in the 
2007 Irish election. 
 
It is reasonable to expect certain components of the mobilisation effort to have better priming 
effects than others. Some of these activities translate clearly into electioneering: Advertising, 
as well as the production and distribution of Unsolicited Materials, serve the clear purpose of 
putting electorally relevant information in the public domain where it is visible to voters. The 
costs associated with Staff offer a good indication of the number of paid people working for 
the campaign, and act as a proxy for campaign professionalisation. More professional 
campaigns are more likely to be effective at reaching voters and delivering a persuasive 
message. Therefore, these three types of activities should exert an effect on the mobilisation 
                                                        
3 For further detail, see Appendix A. 
4 For further detail, see http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1983/2#Scenario5Help. 
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of voters. On the other hand, costs under Accommodation and Administration, as well as 
Transport, are less likely to translate directly into voter mobilisation. These expenses, while 
necessary to keep the campaign machine running, do not create additional visibility for the 
campaign. Finally, Public Meetings allow candidates to get their message directly to voters, 
but are likely to attract people who are already politically active (even if still undecided). As 
such, they are unlikely to add significantly to the pool of already existing voters. Given the 
above, we expect only Advertising, Unsolicited Material, and Staff to have a positive impact 
on turnout. 
 
Data and Measures 
We use official electoral expenditure data provided by the Electoral Commission to capture 
constituency-level campaign effort. These data have several advantages: i) they cover all 
candidates and parties who stood for election, as declaration of spending is required by law, 
thus avoiding the problem of missing observations that plagues candidate surveys, ii) they are 
more accurate than survey-based self-reported measures of campaign spending, iii) data are 
collected in a compatible manner across the electoral contexts, allowing for comparisons, and 
iv) they capture campaign effort in a nuanced manner by requiring candidates to indicate how 
much was spent on all six types of campaign activities listed above. These measures are then 
integrated with the official election results from the Electoral Commission and constituency-
level socio-economic indicators from the most recent 2011 Census.5 
 
Dependent Variable and Core Explanatory Variables 
The dependent variable in our study – turnout – is operationalised as the per cent of voters in 
the constituency who cast a valid vote, ranging from 0 to 100. 
 
Marginality describes the expected openness of the electoral race in a given constituency. It 
is operationalised as the difference between the vote share of the winner and the runner up at 
the previous election, with higher values corresponding to a greater margin of victory (i.e., a 
less competitive constituency).6 The relevant majority in the constituency is based on the 
                                                        
5 Socio-economic indicators are specific to the constituency boundaries used at the given election. For example, 
Census data is adapted to match the boundaries of the Scottish Westminster constituencies at the 2010 general 
election for models on the 2010 general election, and the Scottish Holyrood constituencies for models on the 
2011 devolved elections. 
6  Estimates from models using dichotomous measure of marginality – i.e., coded as 1 ‘marginal’ if the 
difference in the vote share of the winner and runner-up was less than 10% at the previous election, and 0 ‘safe’ 
if it was more than 10% – are robust to the findings presented here and available from the authors. 
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preceding contest since this represents the status quo ante of local electoral dynamics on 
which voters base their decisions (Johnston and Pattie 2006).7 
 
The second core explanatory variable is total campaign effort in a given constituency during 
the short campaign. The short campaign is the time between the dissolution of the legislative 
body and polling day; campaign expenses during this time must be recorded and reported by 
local campaign teams in all electoral contexts analysed here.8 The measure we employ is 
obtained by dividing candidates’ cumulative expenditure at the constituency level (i.e., the 
overall amount spent in the constituency) by the legal spending limit in the constituency. The 
legal spending limit is a function of electorate size and constituency type, varying across the 
constituencies. Thus, a relative measure of campaign effort (i.e., dividing absolute spending 
by the spending limit) is more appropriate than an absolute one when assessing the effects of 
campaign effort across multiple constituencies in Britain.9  
 
In a similar vein, we develop six disaggregated constituency-level measures of spending for 
each type of campaign activity highlighted above – i.e., advertising, unsolicited material, 
transport, public meetings, staff, accommodation and administration.10 As per total campaign 
effort, the six disaggregated measures are operationalised in relative terms where cumulative 
spending on a particular campaign activity in a constituency is divided by the legal spending 
limit in the constituency.11 
 
Other Explanatory Variables and Controls 
                                                        
7 Marginality in the 2010 Westminster constituencies is based on the 2005 constituency-level electoral results 
obtained from Pippa Norris and Alex Singleton (2009). Marginality in the 2011 devolved elections is based on 
the actual 2007 constituency-level electoral results in Wales (National Assembly for Wales 2010) and notional 
2007 constituency-level electoral results in Scotland (Denver 2010). 
8 The periods of ‘short campaign’ – were 13/04-06/05/2010 for the 2010 general election, 25/03-05/05/2011 for 
the 2011 devolved election in Wales, and 23/03-05/05/2011 for the 2011 devolved election in Scotland. 
9 Estimates from models that operationalise total campaign effort as an absolute measure – the overall amount 
spent in the constituency – are robust to the findings presented here and presented in Appendix B.  
10 Empirical tests showed that spending on the different campaign activities is correlated very weakly in the case 
of the 2010 general election and the 2011 devolved elections. Moreover, the variance inflation scores for the 
campaign spending categories are low when included in the same OLS model (see Appendix B). Therefore, the 
inclusion of all six spending categories in Models 3 and 4 does not lead to concerns about multicollinearity. 
11 Estimates from models that measure disaggregated campaign spending in absolute terms – the overall amount 
spent in the constituency on a particular campaign activity – are robust to the findings presented here and 
presented in Appendix B. An illustration of the distribution of spending on each campaign activity in the run up 
to the 2010 general election and the 2011 devolved elections is provided in Appendix D. 
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We incorporate constituency-specific demographic indicators to capture the socio-economic 
outlook of the constituency in addition to marginality and campaign effort.12 These indicators 
tap into distinct elements of the constituency profile. First, we use density to account for the 
level of population concentration in each constituency. The measure is operationalised as the 
number of persons per hectare. Although it is sometimes argued that urbanisation should lead 
to the weakening of inter-personal bonds, a rise in individualism, less personal politics, and 
less social pressure to cast a vote, empirical evidence remains mixed (Geys 2006). Second, 
we include a measure for home ownership to capture the constituency’s socio-economic 
outlook.13 It is operationalised as the per cent of residents in the constituency who live in 
owned residence. It is fair to expect that homeowners reside in their community for longer 
than those who rent, increasing a sense of identification and group solidarity (Ashworth et al. 
2002) and, thereby, adding to the social pressure towards voting (Geys 2006). Therefore, a 
positive effect should be associated with the variable. Third, voting is also likely to be a 
function of one’s social surroundings. We include a control for single occupancy households 
on the premise that people who do not share their residency are likely to receive fewer social 
cues associated with voting. For example, they are less likely to talk about the upcoming 
election at home or be encouraged to go the polling station when their co-habitant does so. 
The variable is operationalised as the ratio of single-person households in the constituency, 
and we expect it to have a negative effect on turnout.  
 
Finally, we explore the effect of the size of the electorate on turnout, measured as the number 
of eligible voters in the constituency in thousands. As the size of the electorate increases, the 
probability that a single vote can influence electoral outcome decreases. Therefore, following 
Downs’ (1957) ‘calculus-of-voting’ model, we expect a larger electorate to lead to a lower 
turnout. We also control for the geographical location of the constituency (nation) – i.e., we 
divide constituencies into those that are in England, Scotland, and Wales –, and constituency 
type by making a distinction between boroughs/burghs and counties.  
 
                                                        
12 We also ran models with previous turnout, instead of the socio-economic characteristics, as an additional 
robustness check. It is noted that previous turnout captures the many demographic factors that may contribute to 
higher or lower levels of turnout (Fisher et al. 2015). Estimates from these models are robust to the findings 
presented here (see Appendices B and C). 
13 Empirical tests showed that home ownership is very highly correlated to other widely used socio-economic 
indicators like car ownership, social grade, social class, with the variance inflation scores for these variables (if 
added to existing models) being over 5. In order not to introduce multicollinearity to the analysis, we relied on 
home ownership as the only indicator of the constituency’s socio-economic outlook. 
12 
 
Empirical Strategy 
We implement two parallel sets of OLS models – one for the 2010 general election and one 
for the 2011 devolved elections –, with the per cent turnout for each 2010/2011 constituency 
as the dependent variable. Both sets of models are specified at constituency level. 
 
The analyses in this paper are based on samples of 615 Westminster constituencies and 111 
Holyrood/Welsh constituencies, respectively. The Speaker’s constituency is excluded as it is 
traditionally not contested by major parties, while some constituencies are excluded because 
the Electoral Commission did not receive a full return from one or more of the major party 
candidates.14 
 
The Effects of Total Campaign Effort and Marginality on Political Participation 
We begin by assessing the effects of overall campaign effort on turnout in the context of the 
2010 general election (Model 1) and the 2011 devolved elections (Model 2). In line with 
previous studies, we find that greater mobilisation effort is associated with higher levels of 
turnout in both electoral contexts. With regard to the competitiveness of the race, our results 
show that participation is higher in constituencies that are more marginal with regard to the 
general election of 2010. Such an effect, however, is not detected in the case of the devolved 
elections. This discrepancy is possibly due to differences in the electoral systems. Regardless 
of how competitive the first-past-the-post Holyrood/Welsh Assembly constituencies happen 
to be, all voters in the devolved elections have a competitive regional ballot to cast for multi-
member regional lists. This provides an incentive to go to the polling station even for those 
who are living in non-marginal first-past-the-post Holyrood/Welsh Assembly constituencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
14 In addition, the analyses in this article exclude the constituencies in Northern Ireland. 
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Table 1. The Effects of Total Campaign Effort and Marginality on Turnout 
  
Turnout 
2010 general election 
Turnout 
2011 devolved elections 
 (1) (2) 
Marginality -.13*** (.02) -.00 (.04) 
Campaign Effort 1.73*** (.30) 5.09*** (.65) 
Single Occupancy Household -.18*** (.05) .19 (.14) 
Population Density .08*** (.01) .02 (.05) 
Home Ownership .31*** (.03) .50*** (.07) 
Electorate -.00 (.02) -.04 (.05) 
Constituency Type^   
County 3.46*** (.43) 1.05 (1.16) 
Nation^^   
Scotland .19 (.60)  
Wales -1.37 (.74) -9.59*** (.78) 
Constant 46.52*** (3.82) 3.38 (9.34) 
Number of Constituencies 615 111 
R-Squared .56 .78 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
^ Reference group is Borough/Burgh. 
^^ Reference group is England for 2010 election, Scotland for 2011 elections. 
 
Turnout is also clearly not just a function of marginality and campaign effort. Among socio-
economic characteristics, higher rates of home ownership correspond with higher turnout. 
The number of eligible voters, however, does not play a significant role. Where the two types 
of elections differ are the effects associated with density and single occupancy households. 
We find significant effects for these two characteristics only in the context of the general 
election where higher levels of turnout are associated with greater population concentration 
and fewer people living as single occupants. Finally, regional differences exist: turnout is 
consistently lower in Wales (reference region for Models 1 and 2 are England and Scotland, 
respectively), although the difference is not statistically significant in the context of the 
general election. 
 
In Figure 1 below, we plot the effects of electoral effort on getting out the vote. The picture 
tells a similar story in both electoral contexts: despite the baseline level of turnout being 
higher at the 2010 general election than the 2011 devolved elections, there are strong positive 
effects associated with campaign effort in both contexts. The nuance is offered here by the 
comparison of the two effect sizes. While the minimum-to-maximum shift in total campaign 
effort in the context of the 2010 general election (from .4 to 4.8 of the legal spending limit) 
brings about a noteworthy increase of 7.6% (from 62.5% to 70.1%) in predicted turnout, a 
corresponding shift in the context of the 2011 devolved elections (from .5 to 3.2 of the legal 
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spending limit) is associated with a significantly larger increase of 13.8% (from 40.9% to 
54.7%) in predicted turnout. Greater campaign effort clearly corresponds to higher likelihood 
of casting a vote at Westminster and Holyrood/Welsh Assembly elections, but its mobilising 
capacity is notably greater in the run up to the latter.  
 
Figure 1. The Effect of Total Campaign Effort on Turnout 
  
 
We turn our focus now to the potential interplay between campaign effort and marginality in 
order to uncover whether the effect of campaign effort is conditioned by the openness of the 
race. We explore such a dependency – or lack thereof – in Table 2, where we show the results 
of the multiplicative models. Model 3 presents the results for the 2010 general election and 
Model 4 outlines these for the 2011 devolved elections. While all control variables are in line 
with what was seen in Models 1 and 2, the interactive effects present some unexpected 
patterns. 
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Table 2. The Effects of Campaign Effort Conditional on the Marginality of the Race 
  
Turnout 
2010 general election 
Turnout 
2011 devolved elections 
 (3) (4) 
Marginality -.11** (.04) -.11 (.11) 
Campaign Effort 1.92*** (.47) 4.28*** (1.02) 
Campaign Effort*Marginality -.01 (.02) .07 (.06) 
Single Occupancy Household -.19*** (.05) .18 (.14) 
Population Density .08*** (.01) .02 (.05) 
Home Ownership .30*** (.03) .48*** (.07) 
Electorate -.00 (.02) -.04 (.05) 
Constituency Type^   
County 3.46*** (.44) 1.09 (1.16) 
Nation^^   
Scotland .20 (.60)  
Wales -1.39 (.74) -9.60*** (.78) 
Constant 46.36*** (3.83) 6.22 (9.74) 
Number of Constituencies 615 111 
R-Squared .56 127 / 165 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
^ Reference group is Borough/Burgh. 
^^ Reference group is England for 2010 election, Scotland for 2011 elections. 
 
The coefficients for the interaction terms in Model 3 and Model 4 are both insignificant. This 
indicates that the effectiveness of the mobilisation effort is not conditioned by the openness 
of the race. Our expectation on the moderating role of marginality is not met: campaign effort 
is equally beneficial in stimulating voter turnout in higher and lower competition contexts. 
The wellbeing of a democracy relies on the levels of electoral participation and our findings 
show that, no matter how close a race is, citizens tend to participate more when a local, on-
the-ground campaign provides information on the election.  
 
Campaign Activities Vary in Their Capacity to Mobilise Voters 
Having established that local campaigns do matter, we now assess whether different types of 
electioneering efforts vary in their ability to get out the vote. Similar to the previous analysis, 
we run separate models for the 2010 general election (5) and for the 2011 devolved elections 
(6). Findings are presented in Table 3 below. The concluding message is clear and consistent 
across both electoral contexts: campaign activities differ notably in their capacity to mobilise 
the electorate and get out the vote. We do, however, detect some differences in the dynamics 
of voter mobilisation in the run up to the first- and second-order elections. Starting with a key 
similarity, the production and distribution of unsolicited materials is a good predictor of 
turnout in both electoral contexts. Clearly campaign material that reaches voters at their home 
and directly presents them with electorally relevant information has the capacity to stimulate 
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electoral participation. At least some voters do respond to the stimulus provided by leaflets 
and campaign material in their letterboxes, indicating that electioneering does provide a 
meaningful link between politicians and voters. In terms of differences, Table 3 indicates that 
constituency-level turnout at the 2010 general election (unlike the 2011 devolved elections) is 
a function of the candidates’ cumulative spending on staff as well as the production and 
distribution of unsolicited materials. The positive coefficient for staff suggests that, in the 
context of the general elections, more professional campaigns are better at persuading voters 
to cast their ballot. This is likely to enhance the recent trend of campaign professionalisation 
in Britain and beyond (Scammell 2014). Overall, it is clear that campaign activities differ 
significantly in their capacity to mobilise voters both in the general and devolved elections in 
Britain. 
 
Table 3. The Effects of Different Campaign Activities on Turnout 
  
Turnout 
2010 general election 
Turnout 
2011 devolved elections 
 (5) (6) 
Marginality -.12*** (.01) -.02 (.04) 
Advertising .75 (.78) 4.05 (2.08) 
Unsolicited Material 1.04** (.37) 4.58*** (1.02) 
Transport 2.62 (3.79) 16.17 (8.46) 
Public Meetings -11.51 (7.04) -13.17 (28.24) 
Staff 13.56*** (1.74) 14.24 (7.59) 
Accommodation 1.84 (1.54) 4.55 (3.30) 
Single Occupancy Household -.19*** (.05) .18 (.15) 
Population Density .08*** (.03) .04 (.05) 
Home Ownership .30*** (.03) .50*** (.07) 
Electorate -.01 (.02) -.04 (.06) 
Constituency Type^   
County 2.83*** (.44) 1.08 (1.20) 
Nation^^   
Scotland .73 (.58)  
Wales -1.01 (.73) -9.19*** (.83) 
Constant 47.89*** (3.69) 4.28 (10.07) 
Number of Constituencies 615 111 
R-Squared .59 .79 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
^ Reference group is Borough/Burgh. 
^^ Reference group is England for 2010 election, Scotland for 2011 elections. 
 
In Figure 2 below, we show the effects associated with those campaign activities that the 
empirical analysis proved to be effective in stimulating turnout, by election type. Figure 2.1 
presents the predicted turnout at the 2010 general election as levels of spending on 
unsolicited materials and staff vary, while Figure 2.2 presents predicted turnout at the 2011 
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devolved elections as the level of spending on unsolicited materials varies. With regard to the 
2010 general election, a minimum-to-maximum shift in spending on staff corresponds to an 
increase of 8.1% (from 63.8% to 71.9%) in predicted turnout, while such a shift for 
unsolicited materials brings about a notably smaller increase of 3.3% (from 63.8% to 67.1%) 
in predicted turnout. In the context of the 2011 devolved elections, a minimum-to-maximum 
shift in spending on the production and distribution of unsolicited materials corresponds to a 
large 10.1% increase (from 42.8% to 52.9 %) in predicted turnout.  
 
Figure 2. The Effects of Different Campaign Activities on Turnout 
Figure 2.1. The Effects of Unsolicited Material and Staff on Turnout in the 2010 General 
Election 
  
Figure 2.2. The Effect of Unsolicited Material on Turnout in 2011 Devolved Elections 
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Conclusions 
Our findings have key implications for those concerned with monitoring the status of 
democratic participation. Electoral participation appears to depend upon the overall campaign 
effort exerted by parties and their candidates. When this mobilisation effort is substantial, the 
returns are significant, with a higher proportion of voters choosing to cast their ballot. This 
applies equally to races of both low and high competiveness, suggesting that (if not to change 
the outcome of the election) mobilisation efforts put in place in the run up to the Election Day 
consistently lead to higher levels of electoral participation. 
 
Our contribution is in three parts. Firstly, we have expanded on the existing literature by 
accounting for the efforts of all players on the ground. Considering the growing success and 
the substantial campaign efforts of the ‘smaller’ parties, they should not be excluded from 
future empirical assessments of the effectiveness of electioneering. The costs associated with 
the act of voting decrease when electorally relevant information is made available and that is 
not a prerogative of large parties only. Secondly, we have confirmed – in line with previous 
research (Fisher at al. 2015) – that not every type of campaign activity has an impact on voter 
turnout, and we have expanded this line of research to second-order elections. At second-
order elections, the only influential form of electioneering seems to be that of unsolicited 
material sent to voters, while money invested in paid staffers is also a good predictor of 
turnout at first-order elections (in addition to unsolicited materials) where greater levels of 
professionalisation within campaigns do help to mobilise the electorate. Thirdly, our 
empirical analysis has shown that first- and second-order elections in Britain are relatively 
homogenous when it comes to electoral mobilisation effects. Although baseline levels of 
turnout are higher at the general elections than the devolved elections, the effect of campaign 
activities on turnout is, after all, quite similar in the two electoral contexts. While still 
different in many respects, first- and second-order elections are not substantially dissimilar 
when it comes to the effects of local campaign efforts. 
 
Our study has shed new light on the extent to which campaign visibility facilitates electoral 
participation in first- and second-order elections, but is certainly not without limitations. First 
and foremost, observational data do not address the mechanisms through which 
electioneering is internalised by voters and how it drives them to the polling station. Also, 
electoral returns are not designed by researchers in the same manner as surveys. The former 
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are imperfect as they do not account for the free labour of volunteers, which still constitutes 
an important part of every campaign. Despite these limits, electoral returns data enable us to 
expand our understanding of campaign processes and facilitate the comparative assessment of 
campaign effort.   
 
In summary, as more electorally relevant information is disseminated in a constituency in the 
run up to the polling day, the costs of voting are reduced and, in turn, a greater proportion of 
the electorate feels sufficiently motivated to cast their ballot. This suggests that campaign 
efforts have a positive impact on internal efficacy and electoral participation. Importantly, 
this is the case in marginal as well as non-marginal constituencies, and at general elections as 
much as at second-order elections. 
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Appendix A. Relevant Rules and Regulations 
 
Representation of the People Act 1983 
List of Matters 
1. Advertising of any nature (whatever the medium used). Expenses in respect of such 
advertising include agency fees, design costs and other costs in connection with preparing, 
producing, distributing or otherwise disseminating such advertising or anything incorporating 
such advertising and intended to be distributed for the purpose of disseminating it. 
2. Unsolicited material addressed to electors (whether addressed to them by name or intended 
for delivery to households within any particular area). Expenses in respect of such material 
include design costs and other costs in connection with preparing, producing or distributing 
such material (including the cost of postage). 
3. Transport (by any means) of persons to any place. Expenses in respect of the transport of 
such persons include the costs of hiring a means of transport for a particular period. 
4. Public meetings (of any kind). Expenses in respect of such meetings include costs incurred 
in connection with the attendance of persons at such meetings, the hire of premises for the 
purposes of such meetings or the provision of goods, services or facilities at them. 
5. The services of an election agent or any other person whose services are engaged in 
connection with the candidate's election. 
6. Accommodation and administrative costs. 
 
Political Parties and Elections Act 2009 
Between 1/1/2010 and 12/4/2010 (dissolution of Parliament), the spending limit for a 
candidate was £25,000 plus: 
– 7p for every elector on the register if in a county constituency; or 
– 5p for every elector on the register if in a burgh constituency. 
Between 12/4/2010 (dissolution of Parliament) and 6/5/2010 (day of poll), the spending limit 
for a candidate was £7,150 plus: 
– 7p for every elector on the register if in a county constituency; or 
– 5p for every elector on the register if in a burgh constituency. 
General spending by parties and non-party campaigners (third parties) was controlled by 
separate national spending limits. 
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Appendix B. Robustness Checks 
 
Table B1 displays findings from models where previous turnout in the constituency is used to 
control for the constituency profile instead of marginality and socio-economic characteristics. 
The previous turnout variable is operationalised as per cent of voters in the constituency who 
cast a valid vote at the 2005 general election or the 2007 devolved elections. Actual turnout is 
used if no boundary changes occurred between the 2005/2007 elections and the 2010/2011 
elections, while notional turnout is used if boundary changes did take place. 
 
Table B1. Previous Turnout as Control 
  
Turnout 2010 
general election 
Turnout 2011 
devolved elections 
Turnout 2010 
general election 
Turnout 2011 
devolved elections 
 (B1.1) (B1.2) (B1.3) (B1.4) 
Previous Turnout .77*** (.02) .91*** (.03) .75*** (.02) .93*** (.04) 
Campaign Effort .91*** (.18) 1.69*** (.42)   
Advertising   -.39 (.60) .60 (1.26) 
Unsolicited Material   .67** (.25) 2.48*** (.58) 
Transport   2.83 (2.89) 1.67 (5.67) 
Public Meetings   -4.48 (5.46) -8.59 (18.20) 
Staff   5.34*** (1.34) -3.25 (4.89) 
Accommodation   1.92 (1.17) .28 (2.08) 
Constant 16.65*** (1.16) -.06 (1.58) 17.60*** (1.21) -1.40 (1.76) 
Number of Constituencies 615 111 615 111 
R-Squared .74 .89 .75 .90 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.   
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Table B2 displays findings from models where campaign effort is operationalised in absolute 
terms – i.e., overall amount spent in the constituency in thousands of pounds. This measure 
does not account for the legal spending limit in the constituency.  
 
Table B2. Campaign Effort in Absolute Amounts (£)  
  
Turnout 
2010 
general 
election 
Turnout 
2011 
devolved 
elections 
Turnout 
2010 
general 
election 
Turnout 
2011 
devolved 
elections 
Turnout 
2010 
general 
election 
Turnout 
2011 
devolved 
elections 
 (B2.1) (B2.2) (B2.3) (B2.4) (B2.5) (B2.6) 
Marginality 
-.14*** 
(.02) 
-.01 (.04) 
-.12*** 
(.04) 
-.12 (.11) 
-.13*** 
(.02) 
-.02 (.04) 
Campaign Effort 
.13*** 
(.03) 
.47*** 
(.06) 
.15*** 
(.04) 
.39*** 
(.09) 
  
Campaign 
Effort*Marginality 
  -.00 (.00) .01 (.01)   
Advertising     .02 (.07) .38 (.20) 
Unsolicited Material     .08* (.03) .42** (.10) 
Transport     .27 (.34) 1.46 (.79) 
Public Meetings     -.82 (.62) -1.23 (2.62) 
Staff     
1.04*** 
9.15) 
1.33 (.70) 
Accommodation     .14 (.14) .42 (.30) 
Single Occupancy 
Household 
-.19*** 
(.05) 
.20 (.14) 
-.19*** 
(.05) 
.18 (.14) 
-.19*** 
(.05) 
.19 (.15) 
Population Density 
.08*** 
(.01) 
.03 (.05) 
.08*** 
(.01) 
.03 (.05) 
.08*** 
(.01) 
.05 (.05) 
Home Ownership 
.30*** 
(.03) 
.50*** 
(.07) 
.30*** 
(.03) 
.49*** 
(.07) 
.30*** 
(.03) 
.50*** 
(.07) 
Electorate -.02 (.02) -.09 (.05) -.02 (.02) -.10 (.05) -.03 (.02) -.09 (.06) 
Constituency Type^       
County 
3.11*** 
(.44) 
.26 (1.19) 
3.11*** 
(.44) 
.30 (1.19) 
2.61*** 
(.44) 
.33 (1.23) 
Nation^^       
Scotland .26 (.60)  .27 (.60)  .77 (.59)  
Wales -1.27 (.75) 
-9.48*** 
(.79) 
-1.29 (.75) 
-9.50*** 
(.79) 
-.91 (.73) 
-9.08*** 
(.84) 
Constant 
48.68*** 
(3.78) 
6.26 (9.48) 
48.49*** 
(3.80) 
9.98 
(10.01) 
49.48*** 
(3.69) 
7.16 
(10.16) 
Number of 
Constituencies 
615 111 615 111 615 111 
R-Squared .56 .78 .56 .78 .58 .78 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
^ Reference group is Borough/Burgh. 
^^ Reference group is England for 2010 election, Scotland for 2011 elections. 
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Table B3 displays the variance inflation factor scores for all independent variables included 
in Models 1 and 2 (Table 1) and in Models 5 and 6 (Table 3). 
 
Table B3. Variance Inflation Factor Scores for Models in Table 1 and Table 3  
  Table 1: Model 1 Table 1: Model 2 Table 3: Model 5 Table 3: Model 6 
Marginality 1.53 1.46 1.55 1.70 
Campaign Effort 1.60 1.25   
Advertising   1.09 1.48 
Unsolicited Material   1.63 1.68 
Transport   1.10 1.10 
Public Meetings   1.08 1.15 
Staff   1.22 1.45 
Accommodation   1.23 1.34 
Single Occupancy Household 1.92 4.22 1.92 4.78 
Population Density 4.03 4.25 4.06 4.59 
Home Ownership 3.94 3.05 3.98 3.35 
Electorate 1.50 1.59 1.53 1.71 
Constituency Type: County 1.99 2.69 2.17 2.75 
Nation: Scotland 1.32  1.36  
Nation: Wales 1.42 1.35 1.47 1.47 
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Appendix C. Campaign Effort Effects from Models with Socio-
Demographic Characteristics versus Previous Turnout 
 
Figures C1 and C2 compare the effect sizes associated with total campaign effort in the run 
up to the 2010 general election and 2011 devolved elections, when derived from models with 
socio-economic characteristics (Models 1 and 2 in Table 1) or previous turnout (Models B1.1 
and B1.2 in Table B1). 
 
Figure C1. The Effects of Total Campaign Effort on Turnout in the 2010 General Election 
 
Figure C2. The Effects of Total Campaign Effort on Turnout in the 2011 Devolved Elections 
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Figures C3, C4, and C5 compare the effect sizes associated with those campaign activities 
that significantly affected voter turnout in the run up to the 2010 general election and 2011 
devolved elections, when derived from models with socio-economic characteristics (Models 
5 and 6 in Table 3) or previous turnout (Models B1.3 and B1.4 in Table B1). 
 
Figure C3. The Effects of Unsolicited Material on Turnout in the 2010 General Election 
 
Figure C4. The Effects of Staff on Turnout in the 2010 General Election 
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Figure C5. The Effects of Unsolicited Material on Turnout in the 2011 Devolved Elections 
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Appendix D. Campaign Activities in Comparison 
 
Figure D1 illustrates the overall distribution of spending on each campaign activity in the run 
up to the 2010 general election and 2011 devolved elections. The information depicted by the 
box plots is clear: candidates spent most on the production and distribution of unsolicited 
materials in both electoral contexts. In an average Westminster constituency in 2010, around 
£15,200 was spent (cumulatively by all candidates) on unsolicited materials. The respective 
sum for the 2011 devolved elections was £13,100. The second highest campaign spending 
category is advertising, but the overall amounts are smaller. The average per-constituency 
spend on it was £3,200 in the run up to the 2010 general election and £2,700 leading up to the 
2011 devolved elections. The four remaining campaign activities were implemented with 
even lower financial investments. 
 
Figure D1. Constituency-Level Spending on Different Campaign Activities (£) 
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Figure D2 displays the distribution of an additional measure – proportion of the constituency-
level campaign spending that is allocated to unsolicited materials – across the three different 
elections. It provides a further indication of the level of money being spent on unsolicited 
materials by candidates, but also illustrates that notable variation exists across constituencies 
in terms of how much of the campaign budgets are allocated to unsolicited materials versus 
other campaign activities. 
 
Figure D2. Proportion of Constituency-Level Campaign Spending on Unsolicited Materials 
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